### 1AC

#### There is a war, between those who say there is a war and those who say they are not. On one side are forces of socialization and neutralization, who isolate forms-of-life from their constitutive ethical connections to enhance capitalist productivity. On the other are those who seek to reclaim the connections joining friends and enemies, who resist the atomizing force of capital, and who reinvigorate conflict at every turn. This debate, this life is a forced choice: whose side are you on?

Read ’10 Jason Read, “From Restricted to General Antagonism: Tiqqun’s Introduction to Civil War,” Unemployed Negativity, 5/27/2010, http://www.unemployednegativity.com/2010/05/from-restricted-to-general-antagonism.html

What then is the best way to read this Introduction? What is intending to introduce, or introduce us to? Despite the epigraph referring to Solon’s The Constitution of Athens (“Whoever does not take sides in a civil war is struck with infamy, and loses all right to politics.”) this is not a history of civil war, and its various theorizations, from the ancient Greeks to Marx on France. This is an introduction in a much stronger sense, not to what has already been said about civil war, but to civil war as an originary condition. What does this mean? As the book’s initial, almost geometrical definitions spell it out, the elementary unit of human existence is the form-of-life, not the body or individual. Every form of life is affected by a particular inclination, a taste. These inclinations determine the various encounter that forms of life, encounters that follow a logic reminiscent of Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza, in which each encounter [either] increases power, constituting community, or reduces it. (I know I said that I did not want to do this, but it is hard not to see the traces of Deleuze, Spinoza, Agamben, and Schmitt in this conceptualization but the point to move beyond the names, to the fundamental assertion that they make possible.) The ethico-political is this relationship of friendship or enmity, or relations that either put a form-of-life in contact with its power or distant it from it. **This terrain** of encounters **is the originary civil war**, the conflict and community of forms of life. “Civil war is the free play of forms-of-life; it is the principle of their coexistence.” Against this fundamental coexistence and conflict the State and Empire can only be understood as attempts to **neutralize** the conflict. As Tiqqun write, “The modern state, insofar as it still exists, defines itself ethically as the theater of operations for a twofold fiction: the fiction that when it comes to forms-of-life both neutrality and centrality can exist.” The state emerges from civil war, which it claims to end, but only continues by other means. At this point Hobbes becomes an unavoidable point of reference. However, that obscures the particular novelty of Tiqqun’s intervention. What they would like to stress is precisely this idea of a form-of-life, an inclination, as something irreducible to bare life. This is what the stand cannot withstand, it can only govern only individuals, over lives that have renounced their inclination, becoming interchangeable. “What at the molar scale assumes the aspect of the modern state, is called at the molecular scale the economic subject.” Tiqqun’s analysis cuts through the ethical, political, and economic by focusing precisely on this relation between a life and its capacities and inclinations. What Tiqqun insist is the political can only be thought from thinking precisely what is at stake in the **sheer** **plurality** and relations of the different forms-of-life, refusing the division that separates some individual, citizen or economic subject, from its constitutive conditions and relations. This splitting is central to politics, to the state, and to philosophy. The enlightenment division between free thought and obedience is the neutralization of both. As Tiqqun write: “Gesture without discourse on the one hand and discourse without gesture on the other—the State and Critique guarantee by the techniques specific to each (police and publicity, respectively) the neutralization of every ethical difference. This is how THEY conjured away, along the free play of forms-of-life, the political itself.” Such an assertion seems like a needed return to anarchist (or anarcho-syndicalist) themes of self-government, of the necessity of the practical dimension of every idea, on the terrain of contemporary ontological speculation. For Tiqqun Empire is a continuation of this strategy of neutralization, it is predicated on the attenuation of forms-of-life. As such it embraces conflict and crisis, making the impossibility of the state’s neutrality the condition of its rule. It governs best in situations of crisis, when the neutrality of law cannot be used. “Nothing matters less to Empire than the question, “who controls what?”—provided, of course, that control has been established.” Empire than is even less of a figure, less of a subject than the state, which was always caught between its supposed neutrality, its transcendence, and its particular location. Empire diffuses this, ruling over the conflicts as such, but defusing them at every turn, inhibiting the possibility of them becoming something other than interests to be represented, markets to be cultivated. As Tiqqun write, “Empire does not confront us like a subject, facing us, but like an environment that is hostile to us.” It is possible to think of this as an antagonism without an enemy. This is the ultimate merit of Tiqqun’s little intervention: returning the idea of conflict to the center of political thought, of a fundamental antagonism that is at once economic, ethical, and political, in an age of consensus and neutralization. I should be more specific and say that its merit has to do with the way it returns conflict to politics without lapsing into Schmittian decisionism, it ontologizes conflict, removing it from the realm of decision. Ultimately, it is an analysis that refuses both nostalgia of old forms of antagonism, a search for an enemy, for a state that could still be party to struggle, and resignation to the disappearance of antagonism. Instead it seeks to interpret the disappearance of antagonism, of struggle, as itself a form of struggle.

#### This war is fought primarily through metaphysical division. Everywhere, we are separated and ordered into atomized, isolated units of production—civilization apart from wilderness, science apart from metaphysics, private apart from public. All this follows from the original establishment of sovereignty, subordinating nature under the whims of man, the political animal.

Smith ’11 Mick Smith, Against Ecological Sovereignty, University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 2011, p. xi-xiii

This contest is political because human dominion over the Earth is not, as so many assume, just a theological idea(l) justified by biblical exegesis or a secular ideology unquestioningly assumed by (supposedly self-critical) Western philosophical systems. It is also the key principle, both theoretically and practically, that underlies the modern political constitution. Here, modern constitution should be understood both in Bruno Latour’s (1993; 2004, 239) “broader metaphysical sense," as the explicit (but never fully achievable) modernist division of the world into two realms: the human and the nonhuman, subjects and objects, evaluatively driven politics and the supposedly apolitical, value-free, natural sciences, and so on—and constitutionally in the narrower po- litical sense; the modern principle of national sovereignty, for example, presumes ecological sovereignty over a specific territory (Kuehls 1996), Ecologically speaking, competing claims to territorial sovereignty, such as those concerning an Arctic seabed now increasingly bereft of its protective ice cap, are all about which state gets to decide how and when these “natural resources" are exploited. Of course, states may also employ ecological rhetoric in staking their claims to be responsible stewards of nature. But making such decisions, even if they occasion- ally involve distinguishing between natural resources and nature re- serves, is the defining mark of ecological sovereignty, and these deci- sions are premised on, and expressions of, the modernist metaphysical distinction between the decisionistic politics associated with (at least some) “properly human subjects” and the objectification of nonhuman nature as a resource. The modern constitution and its overseer, the principle of ecological sovereignty, exemplify what Agamben (2004) re- fers to as the "anthropological machine”—the historically variable but constantly recurring manufacture of metaphysical distinctions to sepa- rate and elevate the properly human from the less-than-fully—human and the natural world. Contesting ecological sovereignty requires that we trace connec- tions between such metaphysical distinctions and political decisions. It requires (to employ a somewhat hackneyed phrase) yet another Copernican revolution—a decentering, weakening, and overturning of the idea/ideology of human exceptionalism. We might say that any cri- tique of political sovereignty failing to attend to these metaphysical dis- tinctions will be ecologically blind, whereas any ecological critique of humanist metaphysics in political isolation will be empty. For example, past environmental critiques of human dominion and debates about the merits of Earthly stewardship (White 1967; Black 1970; Passmore 1974) may have been vital catalysts for the emergence of radical ecol- ogy, but they rarely touched the principle of sovereignty itself, still less recognized its political ramifications. Yet if we keep the political prin- ciple of sovereignty intact, then we automatically and continually give shelter to the notion of ecological sovereignty, and all talk of changed ecological relations is ultimately hollow. Of course, few ecologists are going to protest if a sovereign nation decides to set aside an area as a nature reserve! But the point is that this decision, which divides and rules the world for ostensibly different pur- poses, is plausible only if the overarching authority to make (and adapt and reverse) such all-encompassing decisions is already presumed. It presumes human dominion and assumes that the natural world is al- ready, before any decision is even made, fundamentally a human re- source. This is, after all, both the contemporary condition that nature is being reserved (and yet not released) from, and the original condi- tion of that mythic prepolitical "state of nature” (epitomized in Locke’s work) where a presumptive ecological sovereignty serves as the foun- dational premise for an emergent political sovereignty (see chapter 3), How paradoxical, then, that the decision to (p)reserve some aspects of ecology, to maintain it in what is deemed to be its natural state, has today become a matter of political sovereignty. Paradoxical because, without all nature being initially assumed to be a resource, there would be no original justification for political sovereignty: And yet, without political sovereignty, so the story now goes, nature cannot be preserved from being treated as a resource. Either way, one might say, everywhere sovereignty declares na- ture free, it is already in chains. And metaphysically, ecologically, and politically speaking, the claims and chains of sovereignty are all- encompassing; they encircle the world. In this sense, sovereignty is an antiecological and not, as its accompanying rhetoric and its modern en- vironmental proponents (see chapter 7) sometimes suggest, a potentially ecological principle—at least if we understand ecology as something more than, and irreducible to, a human resource, and this is radical ecology’s (but certainly not only radical ecology’s) understanding. Another way of putting this, and one that fits with the analysis of sovereignty provided by thinkers as politically diverse as Carl Schmitt, Walter Benjamin, and Giorgio Agamben, is to say that the nature re- serve is the exception that decisively proves the rule4 in the sense of both making tangible the dominant ideological norm and exemplify- ing the overarching principle and power of the ruling authority to de- cide. The nature reserve is exempted from being a resource, freed from human domination, only by being already and always included within the remit of human domination. And according to Agamben (2004, 37), this troubling figure of exclusion/inclusion, this “zone of indetermi- nacy," typifies the operation of both sovereignty and the anthropologi- cal machine.

#### A significant consequence of our anthropocentric domination is an elevation of *oikos* over ecology. Environmental concerns are understood in terms of profit margins and security calculations; the prospects that civilization itself is bent on total destruction hardly crosses our registers of thought.

Cohen ’12 Tom Cohen, “Introduction,” Telemorphosis, ed. Tom Cohen, Open Humanities Press, 2012, p. 13-15

Warnings regarding the planet earth’s imminent depletion of reserves or “life as we know it” arrive today more as routine tweets than events that might give us pause, particularly as the current wars over global “sovereign debt” and economic “crises” swamp attention. The intensifying specter of megadebt—at a time of “peak everything” (peak water, peak oil, peak humans)—dumped into a future despoiled of reserves and earning capacity has a specific relation to this white-out—the “economical” and “ecological” tandem shifts all attention to the first term (or first “eco”). In a post-global present consolidating what is routinely remarked as a neo-feudal order, the titanic shift of hyperwealth to the corporatist few (the so-called 1%) sets the stage for a shift to control societies anticipating social disruption and the implications of “Occupy” style eruptions— concerning which the U.S. congress hastily passed new unconstitutional rules to apprehend citizens or take down websites. The Ponzi scheme logics of twenty-first century earthscapes portray an array of time-bubbles, catastrophic deferrals, telecratic capture, and a voracious present that seems to practice a sort of tempophagy on itself corresponding with its structural premise of hyper-consumption and perpetual “growth. The supposed urgencies of threatened economic and monetary “collapse” occlude and defer any attention to the imperatives of the biosphere, but this apparent pause or deferral of attention covers over an irreversible mutation. A new phase of unsustainability appears in which a faux status quo ante appears to will to sustain itself as long as possible and at whatever cost; the event of the twenty-first century is that there will be no event, that no crisis will disturb the expansion of consumption beyond all supposed limits or peaks. In such an environment other materialities emerge, reference systems default, and the legacies of anthropo-narcissm go into overdrive in mechanical ways. Supposedly advanced or post-theory theory is no exception— claiming on the one hand ever more verdant comings together of redemptive communities, and discretely restoring many phenomenological tropes that 20th century thought had displaced. This has been characterized as an unfolding eco-eco disaster—a complex at once economic and ecological.1 The logics of the double oikos appear, today, caught in a self-feeding default. The present volume, in diverse ways, reclaims a certain violence that has seemed occluded or anaesthetized (it is a “present,” after all, palpably beyond “tipping points” yet shy of their fully arrived implications— hence the pop proliferation of “zombie” metaphors: zombie banks, zombie politics, zombie “theory”). It departs from a problem inherent in the “eco” as a metaphoric complex, that of the home (oikos), and the suicidal fashion in which this supposed proper ground recuperates itself from a nonexistent position. The figure of an ecology that is ours and that must be saved precludes us from confronting the displacement and dispossession which conditions all production, including the production of homelands. Memory regimes have insistently, silently and anonymously prolonged and defended the construct of “homeland security” (both in its political sense, and in the epistemological sense of being secure in our modes of cognition), but these systems of security have in fact accelerated the vortices of ecocatastrophic imaginaries. If a double logic of eco-eco disaster overlaps with the epoch in deep time geologists now refer to as the “anthropocene,” what critical re-orientations, today, contest what has been characterized as a collective blind or psychotic foreclosure? Nor can one place the blame at the feet alone of an accidental and evil ‘1%’ of corporate culture alone, since an old style revolutionary model does not emerge from this exitless network of systems. More interesting is the way that ‘theory’, with its nostalgic agendas for a properly political world of genuine praxis or feeling has been complicit in its fashion. How might one read the implicit, unseen collaboration that critical agendas coming out of twentieth century master-texts unwittingly maintained with the accelerated trajectories in question? The mesmerizing fixation with cultural histories, the ethics of “others,” the enhancement of subjectivities, “human rights” and institutions of power not only partook of this occlusion but ‘we theorists’ have deferred addressing biospheric collapse, mass extinction events, or the implications of resource wars and “population” culling. It is our sense of justified propriety— our defense of cultures, affects, bodies and others—that allows us to remain secure in our homeland, unaware of all the ruses that maintain that spurious home.

#### The Imaginary Party is the unrepresentible force combatting the atomization of Empire, seeking to redirect the paradigm of modern power away from bare life toward a politics which enhances and accentuates forms-of-life.

Tiqqun ’10 Introduction to Civil War, Tiqqun, semiotext(e): Los Angeles, 2010, p. 175-187

69 Everything allowed by Empire is for us similarly limited: spaces, words, loves, heads, and hearts. So many nooses around the neck. Wherever we go quarantine lines of petrification spring up almost spontaneously all around us; we feel it in how they look and act. The slightest thing is all it takes to be identified as a suspect by Empire's anemic citizens, to be identified as a risky dividual. There is a never ending haggling over whether we will renounce the intimate relationship that we have with ourselves, something for which they have given us so much flak. And indeed, we will not hold out forever like this, in this tormented role of the domestic deserter, of the stateless alien, of such a carefully concealed hostis. 71 For us, the hostis is this very hostility that, within Empire, orders both the non-relation to self and the generalized non-relation between bodies. Anything that tries to arouse in us this hostis must be annihilated. What I mean is that the sphere of hostility itself must be reduced. 72 The only way to reduce the sphere of hostility is by spreading the ethico-political domain of friendship and enmity. This is why Empire has never been able to reduce this sphere of hostility, despite all its clamoring in the name of peace. The becoming-real of the Imaginary Party is simply the formation— the contagious formation—of a plane of consistency where friendships and enmities can freely deploy themselves and make themselves legible to each other. 73 An agent of the Imaginary Party is someone who, wherever he is, from his own position, triggers or pursues the process of ethical polarization, the differential assumption of forms-of-life. This process is nothing other than tiqqun. 74 Tiqqun is the becoming-real, the becoming-practice of the world. Tiqqun is the process through which everything is revealed to be practice, that is, to take place within its own limits, within its own immanent signification. Tiqqun means that each act, conduct, and statement endowed with sense— act, conduct and statement as event—spontaneously manifests its own metaphysics, its own community, its own party. Civil war simply means the world is practice, and life is, in its smallest details, heroic. 75 The defeat of the revolutionary movement was not, as Stalinists always complain, due to its lack of unity. It was defeated because the civil war within its ranks was not worked out with enough force. The crippling effects of the systematic confusion between hostis and enemy are self-evident, whether it be the tragedy of the Soviet Union or the groupuscular comedy. Let’s be clear. Empire is not the enemy with which we have to contend, and other tendencies within the Imaginary Party are not, for us, so many hostis to be eliminated. The opposite is, in fact, the case. 76 Every form-of-life tends to constitute a community, and as a community tends to constitute a world. Each world, when it thinks itself—when it grasps itself strategically in its play with other worlds discovers that it is structured by a particular metaphysics which is, more than a system, a language, its language. When a world thinks itself, it becomes infectious. It knows the ethic it carries within, and it has mastered, within its domain, the art of distances. 77 For each body, the most intense serenity is found by pushing its present form-of-life to the limit, all the way to the point where the line disappears, the line along which its power grows. Each body wants to exhaust its form-of-life and leave it for dead. Then, it passes on to another. This is how a body gets thicker, nourished with experience. But it also becomes more supple: it has learned how to get rid of one figure of the self. 78 There where bare life was, the form-of-life should come to be. Sickness and weakness do not really happen to bare life in its generic sense. They are affections that touch, in a singular way, specific forms-of-life, and are scripted by the contradictory imperatives of imperial pacification. If we manage to bring everything they exile to the confused language of bare life back home to the terrain of forms-of-life, we can invert biopolitics into a politics of radical singularity. We have to reinvent the field of health, and invent a political medicine based on forms-of-life. 79 Under the current conditions imposed by Empire, an ethical grouping has to turn itself into a war machine. The object of the war machine is not war. To the contrary, it can “make war only on the condition that they simultaneously create something else, if only new nonorganic social relations” (Deleuze, A Thousand Plateaus). Unlike an army or revolutionary organizations, the war machine has a supplemental relation to war. It is capable of offensive exploits and can enter into battle; it can have unlimited recourse to violence. But it does not need this to lead a full, complete existence. 80 This is where the question of taking back both violence and all the intense expressions of life stolen from us by biopolitical democracies has to be posed. We should start by getting rid of the tired idea that death always comes at the end, as the final moment of life. Death is everyday, it is the continuous diminution of our presence that occurs when we no longer have the strength to abandon ourselves to our inclinations. Each wrinkle and each illness is some taste we have betrayed, some infidelity to a form-of-life animating us. This is our real death, and its chief cause is our lack of strength, the isolation that prevents us from trading blows with power, which forbids us from letting go of ourselves without the assurance we will have to pay for it. Our bodies feel the need to gather together into war machines, for this alone makes it possible to live and to struggle.

#### Text: Affirm the Imaginary Party.

#### What is energy? We commonly define it as work, where work is defined as the transfer of energy. Perhaps energy signifies something more, the basic processes of becoming that continually shape our lived existences and affective interactions. Voting aff lifts restrictions on the lively energy of forms-of-life.

Keller ‘12 Catherine Keller, “The Energy We Are: A Meditation in Seven Pulsations,” Cosmology, Ecology, and the Energy of God, ed. Donna Bowman and Clayton Crockett, Fordham University Press, 2012, p. 11-12

Delight has the bodily feeling of buoyancy, of dancing lightly, effortless motion, **radiant pulsation**. The light of delight vibrates, its energy throbs. No wonder modernity turned into an energy addict. Yet the manic excitations that rock our civilization--instant communication, zippy cars, frequent ﬂights, processed foods, monstrous war waste, even the air conditioning that corrects natural summer slowdown—also drive our dependence on nonrenewable energy. It would seem that we have arrived, we earthlings, at a great turning point. Either we take responsibility for our energies--for the planetary effects of our overuse, overproduction, and abundant waste of energy— or we **blast our way toward** planetary **burnout**. But how shall we energize that sense of responsibility, which may simply feel burdensome, menacing, or paralyzing? To merely speak of energy as a global problem, to objectify energy as a quantiﬁable substance, begins to **drain delight away**. Pin energy down to a lexical unit and you get the standard, dull deﬁnition: energy is “what does work.” But then work is defined as “the transfer of energy.” A bit circular, no? The closed circle itself seems to drain vitality from the open question of planetary life. Might we instead articulate the open circulation of energy, where the multidimensional and conﬂicted signiﬁers of life force and of fuel, of micro- and macrocosmic vibratory ﬁelds, even of spiritual potencies and theological metaphors come into play? Might energy do better work for us when we realize that it is us? If energy is most basically not something that we have but that we are, we might try, experimentally, to think about it differently. We might imagine energy not as a commodity to use nor as a power to calculate, but—with possibly more ﬁdelity both to science and to the spirit of our shared life--as the rhythm of interactivity. From this perspective, energy “does work” but never as a mere means to other ends. Its interactions at every level involve worth for their own sake. Energy signiﬁes the pulsation of life: life as a boundless vitality, life that exceeds the distinction between organic and inorganic. In theological terms, energy connotes not only the efforts of work but the effortlessness of grace as well.

#### Encounter the aff as an intellectual assemblage reaching for criticality, multiplying affective relations to create more out of less. The intellectual and political strategy of the Imaginary party is a fissile reaction; vote aff to make this debate nuclear powered.

Latour ‘4 Bruno Latour, Professor and vice-president for research at Sciences Po Paris, “Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern,” Critical Inquiry 30, Winter 2004

The practical problem we face, if we try to go that new route, is to associate the word criticism with a whole set of new positive metaphors, gestures, attitudes, knee-jerk reactions, habits of thoughts. To begin with this new habit forming, I’d like to extract another deﬁnition of critique from the most unlikely source, namely, Allan Turing’s original paper on thinking machines. 35 I have a good reason for that: here is the typical paper about formalism, here is the origin of one of the icons—to use a cliche´ of antifetishism—of the contemporary age, namely, the computer, and yet, if you read this paper, it is so baroque, so kitsch, it assembles such an astounding number of metaphors, beings, hypotheses, allusions, that there is no chance that it would be accepted nowadays by any journal. Even Social Text would reject it out of hand as another hoax! “Not again,” they would certainly say, “once bitten, twice shy.” Who would take a paper seriously that states somewhere after having spoken of Muslim women, punishment of boys, extrasensory perception: “In attempting to construct such machines we should not be irreverently usurping [God’s] power of creating souls, any more than we are in the procreation of children: rather we are, in either case, instruments of His will providing mansions for the souls that He creates” (“CM,” p. 443). Lots of gods, always in machines. Remember how Bush eulogized the crew of the Columbia for reaching home in heaven, if not home on earth? Here Turing too cannot avoid mentioning God’s creative power when talking of this most mastered machine, the computer that he has invented. That’s precisely his point. The computer is in for many surprises; you get out of it much more than you put into it. In the most dramatic way, Turing’s paper demonstrates, once again, that all objects are born things, all matters of fact require, in order to exist, a bewildering variety of matters of concern. 36 The surprising result is that we don’t master what we, ourselves, have fabricated, the object of this deﬁnition of critique: 37 [BEGIN FOOTNOTE]Since Turing can be taken as the ﬁrst and best programmer, those who believe in deﬁning machines by inputs and outputs should meditate his confession: Machines take me by surprise with great frequency. This is largely because I do not do suﬃcient calculation to decide what to expect them to do, or rather because, although I do a calculation, I do it in a hurried, slipshod fashion, taking risks. Perhaps I say to myself, “I suppose the voltage here ought to be the same as there: anyway let’s assume it is.” Naturally I am often wrong, and the result is a surprise for me for by the time the experiment is done these assumptions have been forgotten. These admissions lay me open to lectures on the subject of my vicious ways, but do not throw any doubt on my credibility when I testify to the surprises I experience. [“CM,” pp. 450–51] On this nonformalist deﬁnition of computers, see Brian Cantwell Smith, On the Origin of Objects (Cambridge, Mass., 1997).[END FOOTNOTE-JSS] Let us return for a moment to Lady Lovelace’s objection, which stated that the machine can only do what we tell it to do. One could say that a ~~man~~ can “inject” an idea into the machine, and that it will respond to a certain extent and then drop into quiescence, like a piano string struck by a hammer. Another simile would be an atomic pile of less than critical size: an injected idea is to correspond to a neutron entering the pile from without. Each such neutron will cause a certain disturbance which eventually dies away. If, however, the size of the pile is suﬃciently increased, the disturbance caused by such an incoming neutron will very likely go on and on increasing until the whole pile is destroyed. Is there a corresponding phenomenon for minds, and is there one for machines? There does seem to be one for the human mind. The majority of them seem to be “sub-critical,” i.e. to correspond in this analogy to piles of sub-critical size. An idea presented to such a mind will on average give rise to less than one idea in reply. A smallish proportion are supercritical. An idea presented to such a mind may give rise to a whole “theory” consisting of secondary, tertiary and more remote ideas. Animals’ minds seem to be very deﬁnitely sub-critical. Adhering to this analogy we ask, “Can a machine be made to be super-critical?” [“CM,” p. 454] We all know subcritical minds, that’s for sure! What would critique do if it could be associated with more, not with less, with multiplication, not subtraction. Critical theory died away long ago; can we become critical again, in the sense here oﬀered by Turing? That is, generating more ideas than we have received, inheriting from a prestigious critical tradition but not letting it die away, or “dropping into quiescence” like a piano no longer struck. This would require that all entities, including computers, cease to be objects deﬁned simply by their inputs and outputs and become again things, mediating, assembling, gathering many more folds than the “united four.” If this were possible then we could let the critics come ever closer to the matters of concern we cherish, and then at last we could tell them: “Yes, please, touch them, explain them, deploy them.” Then we would have gone for good beyond iconoclasm.

#### The role of the ballot is to maximize confrontation.

#### The physical destruction of our world is paralleled only by the emptiness which we experience in our daily lives. The earth has been flattened so that we can put a strip mall on top. Everywhere, power marks out spaces and norms of operation, telling us what to do and where to do it. Debate is no different; conflict is avoided through reference to ‘rules’, reading cards from Webster’s and the US Army, like that’s responsive. We should resist these attempts at neutralization and reclaim this space as a site for conflict.

Tiqqun ‘1 “Notes on the Local,” Tiqqun 2, pp. 178-179, 2001, https://tiqqunista.jottit.com/notes\_on\_the\_local

Everything that today is acceptable as a landscape for us is the fruit of bloody violence and conflicts of a rare brutality. That could be thought of as a summary of what the demokratic government wants to make us forget. Forget that the suburbs have devoured the countryside; forget that the factories have devoured the suburbs, that the deafening, restless, sprawling metropolis has devoured everything. Acknowledging this doesn't necessarily mean feeling sorry about it. Acknowledging it means grasping its possibilities, both in the past and the present. The sectioned-off, policed territory where our everyday life takes place, between the supermarket and the digital code for the downstairs door, between the traffic lights and crosswalks, comprises us. We are inhabited by the space we live in. And this is all the more so now that everything in it, or almost everything in it, operates like a subliminal message. We don't do certain things in certain places, because such things just aren't done. Urban furniture, for example, is almost completely useless - haven't you ever asked yourself who could possibly sit on the benches in one of today's urban neo-squares without succumbing to the most violent despair? There's just one meaning, one function: and that meaning and function are totally prohibitive: "you're only at home when you're at home, or wherever you've paid to be, or wherever you are under surveillance," it reminds us, as if it were its sole purpose to do so. The world is getting globalized, but it's shrinking. The physical landscape we pass through every day at high speeds (in cars, in public transport, on foot, in a rush) basically has such an unreal character to it because in it no one experiences anything at all, and in it nothing can live. It is a kind of micro-desert where we're like exiles, moving about between one piece of private property and the other, between one obligation and another. The virtual landscape, on the other hand, looks much more appealing. The liquid crystal computer screen; Internet navigation; the televised or playstation universes -- these are infinitely more familiar to us than the streets of our own neighborhoods are, peopled in the evenings by the lunar light of the street lamps and the metal curtains and gates on the closed stores. The opposite of the local isn't the global; it's the virtual. The global is indeed so not opposed to the local that the global in fact produces the local. The global only refers to a certain distribution of differences based on a norm that homogenizes them all. Folklore is the effect of cosmopolitanism. If we don't know the local as something truly local, it ends up being a little mini global whole. The local appears to the extent that the global makes itself possible and necessary. Going to work, going shopping, traveling far away from home; that's what makes the local something truly local; otherwise it would be - much more modestly - merely the place you live in. Furthermore, we don't really live anywhere at all, properly speaking. Our existence is merely divided up into sectors delimited by topological and time-schedule lines, into little slices of personalized life. But that's not all; PEOPLE would now also like to make us live in the virtual -- to have us definitively deported. There, life will be reconstituted, into a curious unity of non-time and non-place, as the life PEOPLE wish us to have; a Virtual Life, which, an ad for the Internet says, is "a place where you can do everything that you can't do in real life." But there, where "everything is permissible," the mechanism of the passage from potential to acts is under total surveillance. In other words: the virtual world is the place where possibilities never become real, but remain indefinitely in a state of virtuality. Here prevention wins out over intervention: although everything is possible in the virtual world, that's only because the apparatus itself ensures that everything will remain unchanged in our real lives. Soon, PEOPLE say, we'll be tele-commuting (tele-working) and tele-consuming. In this "tele-life," we will no longer be afflicted by the painful feeling we had in public space that our possibilities were being aborted, every time eyes would meet and then turn so quickly away. The annoyance of being immersed among our contemporaries, who most often are strangers to us - in the streets or elsewhere - will be abolished. The local, expelled from the global, will itself be projected into the virtual, so as to make us believe, once and for all, that nothing but the global exists. To make the pill easier to swallow, it will be necessary to drape that uniformity in multi-ethnic and multi-cultural trappings. While waiting for the advent of tele-life, we suggest the hypothesis that our bodies, in space, have a political meaning, and that domination constantly works to hide it. Shouting a slogan at home isn't the same as shouting it out in a stairwell or out in the street. Doing it alone isn't the same as doing it with a number of people, and so on and so forth. Space is political and space is living, because space is inhabited; it is inhabited by our bodies, which transform it by the simple fact that they are contained within it. And that's why it is put under surveillance, and why it is closed off. The idea of space that represents it as something empty that is then filled up with objects, bodies, and things is a false one. On the contrary, that is just the idea of space obtained by mentally removing from a given concrete space all the objects, bodies, and things that inhabit it. Power as it is today has certainly materialized this idea in its esplanades, its highways, and in its architecture. But it is constantly being threatened by its original defect. When something takes place in a space controlled by the global order, when part of that space actually becomes a place, due to an event arising there, an unexpected turn has occurred, and the global order wants nothing more than to suppress that kind of thing. Against this, it has invented the "local," in the sense that it continually adjusts all its control, data capture, and management devices to fit each particular location. That's why I say that the local is political: because it is the place where the present confrontation occurs.